Logging Packets
In the previous chapter, our XDP application ran until Ctrl-C was hit and permitted all the traffic. Each time a packet was received, the BPF program created a log entry. Let's expand this program to log the traffic that is being permitted in the user-space application instead of the BPF program.
Source Code
Full code for the example in this chapter is availble here
Getting Data to User-Space
Sharing Data
To get data from kernel-space to user-space we use an eBPF map. There are numerous types of maps to chose from, but in this example we'll be using a PerfEventArray.
While we could go all out and extract data all the way up to L7, we'll constrain our firewall to L3, and to make things easier, IPv4 only.
The data structure that we'll need to send information to user-space will need to hold an IPv4 address and an action for Permit/Deny, we'll encode both as a u32
.
myapp-common/src/lib.rs | |
---|---|
- We implement the
aya::Pod
trait for our struct since it is Plain Old Data as can be safely converted to a byte-slice and back.
Alignment, padding and verifier errors
At program load time, the eBPF verifier checks that all the memory used is properly initialized. This can be a problem if - to ensure alignment - the compiler inserts padding bytes between fields in your types.
Example:
#[repr(C)]
struct SourceInfo {
source_port: u16,
source_ip: u32,
}
let port = ...;
let ip = ...;
let si = SourceInfo { source_port: port, source_ip: ip };
In the example above, the compiler will insert two extra bytes between the
struct fields source_port
and source_ip
to make sure that source_ip
is
correctly aligned to a 4 bytes address (assuming mem::align_of::<u32>() ==
4
). Since padding bytes are typically not initialized by the compiler,
this will result in the infamous invalid indirect read from stack
verifier
error.
To avoid the error, you can either manually ensure that all the fields in
your types are correctly aligned (eg by explicitly adding padding or by
making field types larger to enforce alignment) or use #[repr(packed)]
.
Since the latter comes with its own footguns and can perform less
efficiently, explicitly adding padding or tweaking alignment is recommended.
Solution ensuring alignment using larger types:
#[repr(C)]
struct SourceInfo {
source_port: u32,
source_ip: u32,
}
let port = ...;
let ip = ...;
let si = SourceInfo { source_port: port, source_ip: ip };
Solution with explicit padding:
Writing Data
Generating Bindings To vmlinux.h
To get useful data to add to our maps, we first need some useful data structures to populate with data from the XdpContext
.
We want to log the Source IP Address of incoming traffic, so we'll need to:
- Read the Ethernet Header to determine if this is an IPv4 Packet
- Read the Source IP Address from the IPv4 Header
The two structs in the kernel for this are ethhdr
from uapi/linux/if_ether.h
and iphdr
from uapi/linux/ip.h
.
If I were to use bindgen to generate Rust bindings for those headers, I'd be tied to the kernel version of the system that I'm developing on.
This is where aya-tool
comes in to play. It can easily generate bindings for using the BTF information in /sys/kernel/btf/vmlinux
.
First, we must make sure that bindgen
is installed.
Once the bindings are generated and checked in to our repository they shouldn't need to be regenerated again unless we need to add a new struct.
Lets use xtask
to automate this so we can easily reproduce this file in future.
We'll add the following code
Once we've generated our file using cargo xtask codegen
from the root of the project.
We can access these by including mod bindings
from our eBPF code.
Getting Packet Data From The Context And Into the Map
The XdpContext
contains two fields, data
and data_end
.
data
is a pointer to the start of the data in kernel memory and data_end
, a pointer to the end of the data in kernel memory. In order to access this data and ensure that the eBPF verifier is happy, we'll introduce a helper function called ptr_at
. This function will ensure that before we access any data, we check that it's contained between data
and data_end
. It is marked as unsafe
because when calling the function, you must ensure that there is a valid T
at that location or there will be undefined behaviour.
With our helper function in place, we can:
- Read the Ethertype field to check if we have an IPv4 packet.
- Read the IPv4 Source Address from the IP header
To do this efficiently we'll add a dependency on memoffset = "0.6"
in our myapp-ebpf/Cargo.toml
Reading Fields Using offset_of!
As there is limited stack space, it's more memory efficient to use the offset_of!
macro to read
a single field from a struct, rather than reading the whole struct and accessing the field by name.
Once we have our IPv4 source address, we can create a PacketLog
struct and output this to our PerfEventArray
The resulting code looks like this:
- Create our map
- Here's
ptr_at
, which gives ensures packet access is bounds checked - Using
ptr_at
to read our ethernet header - Outputting the event to the
PerfEventArray
Don't forget to rebuild your eBPF program!
Reading Data
In order to read from the AsyncPerfEventArray
, we have to call AsyncPerfEventArray::open()
for each online CPU, then we have to poll the file descriptor for events.
While this is do-able using PerfEventArray
and mio
or epoll
, the code is much less easy to follow. Instead, we'll use tokio
, which was added to our template for us.
We'll need to add a dependency on bytes = "1"
to myapp/Cargo.toml
since this will make it easier
to deal with the chunks of bytes yielded by the AsyncPerfEventArray
.
Here's the code:
- Name was not defined in
myapp-ebpf/src/main.rs
, so usexdp
instead ofmyapp
- Define our map
- Call
open()
for each online CPU - Spawn a
tokio::task
- Create buffers
- Read events in to buffers
- Use
read_unaligned
to read our data into aPacketLog
. - Log the event to the console.
Running the program
As before, the interface can be overwritten by providing the interface name as a parameter, for example, RUST_LOG=info cargo xtask run -- iface wlp2s0
.
$ RUST_LOG=info cargo xtask run
[2022-10-04T12:46:05Z INFO myapp] LOG: SRC 192.168.1.205, ACTION 2
[2022-10-04T12:46:05Z INFO myapp] LOG: SRC 192.168.1.21, ACTION 2
[2022-10-04T12:46:05Z INFO myapp] LOG: SRC 192.168.1.21, ACTION 2
[2022-10-04T12:46:05Z INFO myapp] LOG: SRC 18.168.253.132, ACTION 2
[2022-10-04T12:46:05Z INFO myapp] LOG: SRC 18.168.253.132, ACTION 2
[2022-10-04T12:46:05Z INFO myapp] LOG: SRC 18.168.253.132, ACTION 2
[2022-10-04T12:46:05Z INFO myapp] LOG: SRC 140.82.121.6, ACTION 2